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Abstract
This study investigates environmental policy on the fixed-fee licensing
strategy of clean eco-technology by an innovator having foreign
ownership. We show that near-zero emission taxes accompanied by non-
exclusive licensing regulation can improve social welfare when the cost
gap is small or foreign penetration is high. However, when foreign
ownership is not high, exclusive licensing regulations with an appropriate
emission tax policy may improve social welfare.
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 1. Introduction 
Recent policy concerns on climate change and stricter environmental laws have contributed 
to the development of clean eco-technologies, which are likely to be patented. Given the 
exclusiveness of eco-patents, it is contemporary and critical to examine how the licensing 
strategy of clean eco-technology affects the environmental policy. In fact, many governments 
play a strong role in developing and distributing clean eco-technologies, for example, 
CleanTECH San Diego in USA, LAKES (Lahti Regional Development Company) in Finland, 
Solar Valley Mitteldeutschland in Germany, and Water Cluster in Israel. 
Most research on the R&D activities of cost-reducing innovation has analyzed the 
relationship between market structure and general licensing strategies such as royalty, fixed-
fees, and/or auctioning. Previous literature has shown that “outside innovator”1 prefers fixed-
fee licensing to royalty licensing in perfect competition (Kamien and Tauman, 1984) and 
homogenous oligopoly (Kamien and Tauman, 1986; Kamien et al., 1992), and a fixed-fee is 
superior to auctioning in an asymmetric duopoly (Stamatopoulos and Tauman, 2009) and 
sub-licensing model (Miao, 2013).  
Recent studies also observe that the strategic choice of a fixed-fee contract depends on 
government policies such as import tariff (Kabiraj and Marjit, 2003; Mukherjee and Pennings, 
2006), output tax (Mukherjee and Tsai, 2013), and emission tax (Kim and Lee, 2014, 2016a, 
2016b). Hence, an examination of government policies and their effects on technology 
licensing would enhance our understanding of private licensing strategies. 
This study investigates environmental policy on the fixed-fee licensing strategy of clean 
eco-technology by an innovator with foreign penetration. We show that the optimal licensing 
strategy depends not only on the cost efficiency gap but also on emission tax. We also take 
foreign penetration into account and show that near-zero emission taxes accompanied by non-
exclusive licensing regulation can improve social welfare when the cost gap is small or 
foreign penetration is high. However, when foreign ownership is not high, exclusive licensing 
should be allowed under an appropriate emission tax policy. 
2. Model 
Consider a Cournot duopoly where two firms with homogeneous products that emit 
pollutants compete against each other. The inverse demand function is , where 
21 qqQ   is the market output and iq  (i=1,2) is firm i’s output. We assume that both firms 
have a constant marginal cost ic ; however, firm 1 can be more efficient than firm 2. We 
normalize 1c  to 0 and 2c  represents the cost efficiency gap, where we assume 02 12  cc
A
. 
Now, consider an outside eco-innovator, which licenses environmentally clean eco-
technologies to either one or two firms under fixed-fee licensing. This licensed technology 
enables firms to reduce pollution and consequently expenditure on emission tax. We assume 
a zero-pollution clean technology that produces no emission.2 However, non-licensed firms 
will continue to emit pollution and their emission function is defined as ii qe  . We denote 
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 Outside innovator refers to the situation where the innovator is not a product-market competitor of the 
licensees. 
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 Note that even though the assumption of zero-pollution eco-technology is relaxed, the qualitative implications 
of licensing strategies by an eco-innovator are not directly relevant to this form of abatement technology. 
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 total emission level as 1 2E e e   and environmental damage as dEED )( , which is 
constant to the total emission level. The government will tax this emission at the rate of t. We 
assume that 220
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We analyze fixed-fee licensing contracts, in which the innovator controls licensee profit 
by restricting the number of licenses, and examine how an exclusive contract affects 
equilibrium and welfare. The game runs as follows: In the first stage, for a given emission tax, 
an eco-innovator announces k number of licenses for a fixed-fee, f. In the second stage, two 
polluting firms simultaneously decide whether or not to purchase a license after observing the 
licensing contract. In the third stage, they choose their outputs in the Cournot fashion. 
Subsequently, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is derived through backward induction. 
3. Analysis 
Let us consider a fixed-fee licensing contract in which the innovator announces k (= 1,2) 
number of licensees and charges the same fixed-fee, f(k). Subsequently, the profit functions of 
a licensed firm and a non-licensed firm are determined with the fixed-fee and the number of 
licensed firms as follows:  
)()()( kfqcqQPkH LiiLii   and NiNiiNii teqcqQPkh  )()( ,               
where Liq  and Niq  are the firm’s output levels as a licensee and a non-licensee, respectively. 
Consider k=2. We obtain the maximum willingness to pay a fixed-fee of each firm from 
0)1()2(  ii hH . In the third stage, using the first-order conditions, we have 3
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2cAP   at equilibrium. Therefore, each firm’s maximum willingness to 
pay a fixed-fee is 
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Consider k=1. The fixed fee should be equal to the maximum profit difference of each 
licensee between accepting and rejecting the licensing offer, given that the other firm rejects 
it. That is, )1(if  should satisfy such that 0)0()1(  ii hH . In the third stage, using the first-
order conditions, we have 
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Therefore, the following innovator’s profit is also increasing in t : 
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 Let us define ( 2 )
5
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Proposition 1.  
(i) When 
25
A
c , the innovator chooses an exclusive fixed-fee licensing for all t t . 
(ii) When 20 5
A
c  , the innovator chooses a non-exclusive (exclusive) fixed-fee 
licensing if 2 ( ) Mc c  . 
Proposition 1 implies that the innovator’s licensing strategies depend not only on the level 
of emission tax but also on the cost gap3. The innovator prefers a non-exclusive licensing 
only with a lower cost gap. This is because higher total output and also smaller difference in 
willingness to pay of the license. Thus, licensing to both firms is a more profitable strategy to 
the innovator. When both the cost gap and emission tax are low, purchasing clean eco-
technology is more attractive to an inefficient firm. However, when the cost gap or emission 
tax is high, reducing emissions is more advantageous to an efficient firm since its output is 
larger and willingness to pay for each unit is higher. Thus, an innovator prefers an exclusive 
licensing contract with an efficient firm because the difference in profits increases with clean 
eco-technology.  
4. Environmental Policy with Foreign Penetration 
We assume that the innovator is a private multinational firm that is owned by private 
investors, both domestic and foreign. Let us denote   (0 1  ) as the fraction of foreign 
ownership, that is, foreign penetration. The social welfare function can be defined by 
1 2 2 20
( ) (1 ) ( )QM MW k CS tE dE P u du c q dE               .      
Therefore, the resulting welfare from a licensing strategy with k =1, 2 is given as follows, 
respectively:   
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 , which satisfies (1) (2)W W  in (3) and (4). 
Proposition 2. Non-exclusive (exclusive) licensing improves welfare when 2 ( ) Wc c  . 
Proposition 2 implies that the comparison of welfare between exclusive and non-
exclusive contracts depends on the level of emission tax and foreign penetration. Note that 
there is a trade-off between net consumer surplus (defined as consumer surplus minus 
environmental damage) and producer surplus plus government revenue. When k=2, 
environmental damage is eliminated and net consumer surplus is larger because of low price. 
However, producer surplus and government revenue are larger when k=1 because higher cost 
gap increases innovator’s profit. Therefore, non-exclusive licensing improves welfare only 
when the cost gap is low.  
                                           
3
 Stamatopoulos and Tauman (2009) showed that the revenue from selling the license of a cost-reducing 
innovation depends on the cost efficiency gap. 
 Let us define two sets that pertain to the welfare effect of licensing strategy with k under 
foreign penetration as follows: 
2 2( , ) : {0 | (2) (1)} {0 | }WX t c t t W W t t c c         and 22( , ) : /Y t c R X  
Fig.1 shows that X  is socially desirable under non-exclusive licensing while Y  is 
desirable under exclusive licensing. Thus, X  contains the welfare loss(shaded area) caused 
by an innovator’s strategic choice of exclusive licensing. Note that as foreign penetration 
increases, Wc  moves upward and welfare loss expands4. Note also that if * 2
2
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c
   , 
Wc  lies outside feasible region (0 t t  ) and thus Y  is null. 
Fig.1 Innovator’s optimal choice and welfare 
 
Let us also define *( ) : arg max ( )
t
t k W k  and * *( ) : ( ( ))W k W t k . 
Proposition 3.  
(i) Suppose *  . Prohibiting exclusive licensing with near-zero emission tax can 
improve social welfare for all 2c . 
(ii) Suppose *0    . If 2c X , prohibiting exclusive licensing with near-zero 
emission tax can improve social welfare. However, if 2c Y , allowing exclusive 
licensing under optimal emission tax *(1)t , can improve social welfare. 
Proof. (i) Suppose *  . Then, Y  is null. Welfare in (4) is decreasing in t, which implies 
that a near-zero emission tax is optimal when k = 2. (ii) Suppose *0    . Then, Y  is not 
null. If * *(1) (2)W W , the same results in (1) are still applicable. However, if * *(1) (2)W W , the 
optimal tax is at *(1)t . ■ 
Proposition 3 implies that the optimal policy decision depends not only on the cost gap 
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 but also foreign penetration. When foreign penetration is sufficiently high, the net consumer 
surplus becomes more important from the welfare perspective; therefore, prohibiting 
exclusive licensing with sufficiently low emission taxes will reduce the rent-extraction effect 
of the foreign innovator. However, when foreign penetration is low, the optimal policy 
decision depends on the cost gap, which, if low, still requires near-zero emission tax and non-
exclusion regulations. However, if the cost gap is high, it is beneficial to allow exclusive 
licensing with an optimal emission tax. Therefore, as foreign penetration increases, non-
exclusion regulation on licensing contracts should be adopted. 
5. Conclusion 
Recent concerns on climate change policy and environmental regulation have exerted the 
research on the licensing strategy of clean eco-technology and its effects on the 
environmental policy. We have demonstrated that near-zero emission taxes accompanied 
with non-exclusive licensing regulations can improve social welfare when the cost gap is 
small or foreign penetration is high. However, when foreign ownership is not high, exclusive 
licensing regulations with an appropriate emission tax policy may improve social welfare. As 
a future research, the analysis on the relation between market structure and general licensing 
strategies are necessary. 
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